Carter. NLC-4-1-1-2-3

The document is a confidential briefing on nuclear non-proliferation objectives and strategies to be discussed at a summit meeting. The main objective is to garner endorsement from industrialized nation participants for an international fuel cycle evaluation program that would develop alternative fuel cycles for nuclear energy, reducing proliferation risks for all nations. The program would include a study of current and future generation reactors, with emphasis on cycles that utilize non-sensitive fuels and institutional arrangements for reducing proliferation risks. The document also highlights the need for multilateral incentives to provide international means for states to meet their fuel supply and spent fuel problems without developing full fuel cycle capabilities.

The briefing notes that controls and restraints, such as safeguards and guidelines, are not sufficient to deal with the problem of "peaceful progress towards the bomb," and that multilateral incentives are necessary for effective non-proliferation. The program proposed in the briefing is intended to provide such incentives and reduce the need for nations to acquire expensive and potentially dangerous independent full fuel cycle capabilities.

The document also addresses the attitudes of other summit countries towards the proposed program. It notes that Germany, France, and Japan view reprocessing and full fuel cycle capabilities as necessary for the breeder and reducing energy dependence. The French would welcome a decision to limit nuclear fuel services to nuclear weapons states, while the Canadians support the fuel cycle evaluation program but are concerned about technological discrimination against non-nuclear weapons states. The UK sees the program as a way to overcome obstacles to Britain's commercial ambitions in the nuclear field.

The briefing includes talking points for the program, emphasizing the need to meet legitimate energy needs in a secure and economic fashion, minimize proliferation risks, and reduce incentives for states to acquire costly and dangerous independent full fuel cycle capabilities. It also notes the importance of complementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty with additional measures, such as the proposed fuel cycle evaluation program.