Pages 216-222 from FCO 177-101

The document discusses the views of the writer regarding the Zangger Committee's likely attitude towards two suggestions made by France. The first suggestion pertains to the expansion of the Nuclear Suppliers Group's (NSG) trigger list, and the writer highlights that the Zangger Committee's mandate is to determine what constitutes "especially designed or prepared" (EDP) equipment or material for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material. The writer expresses uncertainty about whether the items mentioned in France's table fall under the category of dual-use or not. The second suggestion concerns expanding the scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and the writer seeks clarification on France's intentions in this regard.

The document also references a previous attempt by the USA to discuss the application of safeguards to trigger list items in the Zangger Committee, which caused confusion and was ultimately not pursued. The writer mentions that the IAEA and supplier states generally place trigger list items on the inventory of a safeguards agreement when exporting them to non-nuclear weapon states not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This ensures that the IAEA can apply safeguards directly to the items themselves, similar to nuclear material. The USA believes that trigger list items should be subject to IAEA safeguards when exported to non-NPT states and recommends the Zangger Committee adopt this view.

Furthermore, the document briefly touches on the discussion of Iraq's nuclear program, where the USA emphasizes the need for close monitoring of exports that could contribute to Iraq's nuclear capability due to its clandestine acquisition methods.