Pages 137-140 from FCO 177-94

The document discusses the Non-Proliferation Working Group's efforts to address nuclear-sensitive dual-use exports. The main points are as follows:

1. The UK notes that the US proposals are intended to cover dual-use items only, not specific nuclear items. They suggest that any multilateral arrangement should be incorporated into the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rather than the Zangger Committee.

2. Both the US and UK agree that the control of dual-use exports is a problem and that a multilateral arrangement is necessary due to increased awareness of proliferation dangers, changes in export controls, and attempts by non-nuclear weapon states to exploit loopholes.

3. The US delegation plans to amend their draft proposal and discuss it with NSG countries. The US envisions an arrangement initiated by an INFCIRC document issued by the IAEA, with countries indicating their adherence by informing the Director-General. They are open to the idea of an open regime but wish to keep an open mind regarding the administration of the arrangement.

4. The UK provides detailed comments on the guidelines, expressing concerns about their strict interpretation, provisions on notification and transfers, and the need for a targeted list of dual-use items. The US delegation promises to review these comments.

5. The UK stresses the importance of defining the technology to be controlled and keeping the list of dual-use items concise for effective implementation.

6. The US delegation suggests the establishment of a working group to further study the issue after the meeting in The Hague, which the UK supports.

Overall, the document highlights the ongoing discussions and efforts to establish a multilateral arrangement to address nuclear-sensitive dual-use exports, with a focus on incorporating it into the work of the NSG.