Pages 21-25 from FCO 66/1098 - Nuclear Suppliers Group 1978

Description

The document is a summary of a confidential Anglo-Soviet political consultation held on a 11 April 1978. The meeting discussed various topics related to nuclear proliferation and international agreements. Key points mentioned in the summary include:

  1. The UK believed that further work was needed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and a meeting was necessary to discuss unfinished business, full fuel cycle safeguards, enlargement, and overlapping controls.

  2. The Soviet Union expressed support for the continuation of the Suppliers Group and emphasized the importance of reaching agreement on full fuel cycle safeguards.

  3. The UK proposed a discussion within the Suppliers Group regarding the export of research reactors and the inclusion of certain equipment in the trigger list. The US also suggested discussing the difficulties posed by their Non-Proliferation Act.

  4. Timing for a further meeting was considered, with options in June or early July 1978 or September for more preparation time.

  5. The French had not conducted a serious review of their policy on non-proliferation and safeguards after the elections, and the UK did not expect a fundamental change in their stance.

  6. The UK and the Soviet Union discussed the possibility of an understanding in the Suppliers Group that would prevent new commitments to supply trigger list items to countries with unsafeguarded facilities.

  7. The UK expressed interest in associating with a separate Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) agreement, and the Soviet Union suggested the UK's material association could include establishing seismic installations in the southern hemisphere.

  8. The UK preferred to focus on reaching a tripartite agreement on substance before deciding how to present the CTB in the Conference on Disarmament (CCD).

  9. The Soviet Union favored the "Moscow formula" of presenting the CTB to the international public only after it had been signed and expressed concerns about involving too many countries in the drafting process.

  10. The Soviet Union emphasized the importance of stronger safeguards in the IAEA/EURATOM agreement, particularly regarding non-light water reactors.

  11. The Canadians nominated Mr. Prince for the position of Deputy Director-General of the IAEA, but the Soviet Union preferred a younger candidate like Mr. Fulford.