Pages 53-59 from FCO 66758 - US Proposal for Common Nuclear Export Policies 1975

This document is a summary of a confidential meeting held on October 29, 1975, regarding nuclear suppliers' cooperation. The meeting involved participants from various organizations, including the Bureau of Politico/Military Affairs, the State Department, FCO, ACDA, ERDA, and others. The main points discussed in the meeting were:

1. Concerns were raised about the publication of an article in the Financial Times that detailed the current state of play in the nuclear suppliers talks. The participants were unsure about the source of the article and its potential damage to securing French cooperation.

2. Detailed exchanges with the French and Canadian representatives were discussed. While the Canadian exchanges were inconclusive, it was believed that if the French accepted the proposed formula for paragraph 4 of the guidelines and made their position clear in a separate unilateral statement, the Canadians would likely go along with this arrangement.

3. The Canadians had discussed their conversation with Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Kissinger, indicating that Trudeau believed he had Kissinger's full support for his policy towards the nuclear suppliers talks.

4. The possibility of a unilateral statement by the French was suggested, which might help secure the agreement of other participants to this compromise.

5. The Japanese were mentioned as a country that might have difficulty accepting the proposed compromise, regardless of whether the French made a unilateral statement or not.

6. A draft resolution for submission to the IAEA Board of Governors was circulated, aiming to establish a new system of safeguards within the IAEA. The proposal was intended to address political realities and provide an alternative to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

7. Some participants expressed reservations about the proposed initiative, questioning its efficacy and potential consequences. They were concerned that it might weaken the existing system and fail to attract new signatories.

8. The participants discussed the objections of non-signatories to the NPT and the difficulty of finding a formula that would persuade them to give up their nuclear option.

9. It was emphasized that taking some initiative was necessary, even if there were reservations. The support of Mr. Ekund was mentioned, and it was suggested that the proposal could be killed if it proved unacceptable.

10. The discussion continued with a review of the draft guidelines and the amendments proposed by the French.

11. The American side expressed serious reservations, particularly regarding the proposal for a "fundamental attack" in the IAEA. They believed that diplomacy should proceed cautiously and only when the grounds were sure.

12. The meeting concluded with the recognition that an agreement was close, but failure was also a possibility.

13. The next morning, the participants reviewed INFCIRC 153 and identified points that would likely need to be amended to provide a satisfactory basis for a new system of safeguards.

14. It was noted that there were no significant differences between the two sides regarding the content of a new agreement, but the question remained about which proposed resolution was the safest and best approach. The American side preferred a slightly different resolution that avoided reference to the proposed new safeguards system to the Board of Governors.

Overall, the meeting involved discussions about the state of the nuclear suppliers talks, the role of unilateral statements, proposed resolutions, and concerns about the efficacy and consequences of alternative approaches to the NPT.