NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-5-57

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 1. We estimate that the Soviet guided missile program is extensive and enjoys a very high priority. (Paras. 17, 27, 29- 30, 50) 2. We believe that the USSR has the native scientific resources and capabilities to develop during this period advanced • types of guided missile systems, in all categories for which it has military requirements. (Paras. 29-38) • 3. We estimate that the USSR has the . industrial base and related industrial experience to series produce the missile systems it will develop during this period. However, in view of competing demands, the limited availabliity of electronic equipment will seriously restrict the extent and variety of Soviet guided missile production until about 1958. Thereafter, expanding electronics production will probably make this restriction much less severe. (Paras. 45-48) 4. We estimate that the USSR has requirements for various sizes of nuclear, high explosive (HE), and chemical (CW) warheads, and has the capability to develop them on time scales consistent with the missiles in which they would be employed. In view of competing demands, the availability of fissionable materials will impose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead production during the period of this estimate. (Paras . 39-42, 54, Annex A)