Special National Intelligence Assessment

We affirm the findings and judgments of SNIE 4-1-74, which address the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation. The report concludes that by the 1980s, many countries will possess the technological and economic capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. However, it emphasizes that the extent of proliferation will primarily depend on political factors.

This Memorandum to Holders discusses the concept that certain countries may aim to achieve their political and potentially military objectives by acquiring a limited nuclear explosive capability without undergoing time-consuming "weaponization" processes. The memorandum concludes that several countries could accumulate enough fissile material and complete the necessary research and development work to fabricate a nuclear explosive device without technically violating the safeguard provisions of the IAEA or NPT. The fabrication process could be completed within a few days. However, it's important to note that in nearly all cases, this step would involve a violation of safeguard agreements.

Table 1 on page 6 provides the earliest technically feasible dates when various countries could possess a nuclear device, based on their technical capabilities. These dates should not be considered as definitive or certain. Any actual attempt to fabricate and/or test a nuclear device would only occur after considering the political and strategic situation, and only when a country is desperate enough to accept the consequences of breaking safeguard agreements.

In most cases, the fabrication of nuclear devices is discussed in SNIE 4-1-74 as part of a broader program aimed at producing nuclear weapons. The level of effort and time required to produce weapons discussed in the SNIE would be greater than that needed for the fabrication of the devices mentioned in this memorandum. Therefore, it is not appropriate to directly compare the dates provided in the SNIE with the earlier technically feasible dates for nuclear devices mentioned in this memorandum. Here, we are primarily concerned with single, non-weaponized nuclear explosives, which, due to their political impact, may serve as the ultimate goal of the program.