Key Takeaways from my PhD Research
In a previous post, I shared details of my book, “International Nuclear Export Controls and Nonproliferation: The Collective Action Problem”. The book was released by Routledge on 28 Sept 2021. In this post, I wanted to share some of the key takeaways from the book in which I examine the issue of proliferation and nonproliferation through the lens of collective action problem. As a practitioner in the export control domain, I intend to use these insights in my work to help states better implement and coordinate effective controls.
- Cooperation on nonproliferation and export controls is in the interests of all states as it is in no state’s interest to see strategic technology diffuse to potential adversaries. But mistrust, a lack of transparency around implementation, and vested interests slows adoption of controls.
- Given cooperation is a mutual interest, overcoming these factors is feasible but requires a number of enablers. This includes community building to generate mutual understanding and trust, transparency around how controls are being implemented so that states can be assured that others are meeting their commitments, and the development and refinement of a clear set of rules.
- States have usually been willing to forego the commercial benefit of specific transactions when it is clear that the transaction would contribute to proliferation and when they have confidence that other states will not step in to fulfill the order. While there are exceptions to this, it speaks to the importance of the point above.
- Suspicion that other states are not living up to their commitments has plagued the development of controls – both in cases where the suspicions were true and not. The lack of international enforcement, which results from a desire for states to safeguard sovereignty, means that there is no international mechanism to confirm or refute such concerns.
- Limited cooperation between smaller groups proves easier to achieve because some of the points above are less problematic for likeminded countries (more trust, more openness to transparency etc). But controls implemented by likeminded countries are inherently less effective as they are not global in scope and do not cover all relevant actors.
- Great powers can usually quite readily agree not to transfer strategic capabilities to third countries. The reason for this is that it is usually in the interests of great powers to maintain a monopoly of control on critical technologies. Once this mutual interest is recognized, the barrier too adoption of controls involves third countries rather than the great powers.
- Involvement of the UNSC in adopting nonproliferation controls, which is eased by the point above, can be thought of as a type of externally enforced regulation. However, the utility of this approach has proven to be of limited effect in practice because states have tended not to fully implement the requirements of the UNSC.
Ultimately, in the anarchic international system, international bodies offer potential as a third-party enforcement and verification mechanism. However, to date, states have opted not to pursue the creation of such mechanisms. As mentioned, the primary driver for this relates to states’ desire to maintain sovereignty. In practice, any such mechanism would need some of the above-mentioned points to be addressed. In the absence of this, export controls and related mechanisms will be slow to evolve and limited in effect.